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Introduction
The fear of becoming unemployed in the future is destructive to a personƒs subjective wellbeing. Taking into account the devastating impact of the risk of future unemployment, having been unemployed in the past has only a negligible effect on individual life satisfaction. This is the main result of this paper, which provides a more detailed view of the findings of Clark et al. (2001) , who show that unemployment experienced in the past makes an individual less satisfied with his current life situation even if he has become reemployed in the meantime. Clark et al. (2001) label this the ‚scarring‚ effect of unemployment: past unemployment leaves a permanent scar on oneƒs face, it inflicts permanent damage on the human psyche that leads to lower life satisfaction independently of a personƒs current labor market status. In this paper, we will provide an explanation why this scarring effect arises. We argue that past unemployment influences current well-being mainly indirectly because people use the information on how often they have been unemployed in the past as an indicator of their future labor market success. If a person infers from more frequent unemployment episodes in the past that he is also more likely to be unemployed in the future, the drop in life satisfaction correlated with past unemployment will, to a large extent, be caused by the fear of future unemployment.
Past unemployment leaves a •scar‚ because it •scares‚ the individual about the future.
While Clark et al. (2001) show that past unemployment is negatively correlated with current life satisfaction, they use the term scarring descriptively, leaving open why this phenomenon occurs. To fill this gap, we extend the study by Clark et al. (2001) by including different measures of the likelihood of future unemployment in our regression analysis. This allows us to distinguish between two interpretations of the scarring effect. Our first interpretation is that past unemployment is genuinely scarring. In this case, it would reduce current life satisfaction independently of its impact on future expectations. To support this interpretation, we would need to find that past unemployment has a negative impact on current life satisfaction, even if we held a personƒs expectations about future unemployment constant. Our second interpretation is that past unemployment works through scaring a person about the future.
According to this view, we should find that the fear of future unemployment reduces current well-being, holding the time a person has been unemployed in the past constant. While both effects could potentially be present at the same time, our analysis supports the scaring effect: the fear of future unemployment is detrimental to current well-being. The inclusion of future expectations as a separate predictor of life satisfaction substantially weakens the genuine scarring hypothesis. Once we control for insecurity about future employment prospects, past unemployment loses much of its explanatory power for current life satisfaction. The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present our data and our estimation methodology. Section 3 contains our empirical results. The last section provides a summary and concludes.
Data and Econometric Framework
Our empirical analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).
1 The data set we use is the 22 waves for the period from 1984 to 2005. We consider all German nationals of working age between 25 and 55. This yields an unbalanced panel with about 120,000
person-year observations.
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Our data on subjective well-being stem from a question in the GSOEP that asks respondents: •How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?‚ The question had to be answered on an ordinal scale from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied).
As our benchmark, we reproduce the estimation specification by Clark et al. (2001) . Under this approach, contemporary life satisfaction is explained by a set of personal characteristics, a personƒs current employment status, and his unemployment history. We estimate the empirical well-being function: Clark et al. (2001) . The only difference concerns the separate treatment of the individuals that are out of the labor force and those active in the labor force in the estimation specification. This is necessary because the out of the labor force group do not provide information about their future employment prospects.
the results. 3 The vector X it is a set of explanatory variables that can potentially influence the well-being of the individual (such as income, marital status, etc.). ˆi is an individual fixed effect that captures unobserved time-invariant differences between individuals (personal traits), ‰ t denotes unobserved time-varying circumstances in a specific year that affect all individuals equally, and Š it is a random error term.
We compare this benchmark with an extended model in which we take indicators of the fear of future unemployment into account. We extend the estimation equation (1) by including measures of a personƒs subjective expectation about the likelihood of future unemployment: The amount of time a person has been unemployed in the past is correlated with this personƒs perception of future unemployment risk. This correlation is illustrated in Table 1 .
Among all employed persons who have been unemployed for less than one third of the previous three years, 46.0 percent feel that they have high job security (•not concerned‚). Only 13.6 percent think that their job security is low (•very concerned‚). Employed persons with more past unemployment experience deem their jobs riskier. Among currently employed persons who have been unemployed for more than two-thirds of the previous three years, only 26.8 percent are not concerned about their job security, while 32.8 percent are very concerned. A similar picture emerges for the unemployed. The share of unemployed who think that it is easy for them to find a new job drops from 9.1 percent for those with unemployment of less than one-third of the previous three years to only 1.5 percent for past unemployment more than two-thirds of the previous three years. The share of unemployed who find it almost impossible to find a new job rises from 16.0 percent to 39.9 percent when comparing the un-3 In the GSOEP, employed and unemployed persons are not asked the same question about their future prospects.
In the following analysis, we thus cannot group the impact of future insecurity on the employed and the unemployed into a common effect and a differential effect. Instead, we have to estimate separate interaction effects. For expositional consistency, we apply the same distinction for the effect of past unemployment as well.
employed with little experience of past unemployment with those who have experienced unemployment for most of the previous years. These numbers clearly illustrate that past unemployment is an indicator of a personƒs subjective perception of future unemployment risk. Clark et al. (2001) estimate the total effect of past unemployment on life satisfaction without distinguishing between the direct effect of past unemployment and its indirect effect through its negative impact on future unemployment risk. We can operationalize these two effects by writing the life satisfaction function as
X is a vector of various determinants of life satisfaction. PASTUN has a direct effect on life satisfaction LS and an indirect effect via future prospects. The total impact of past unemployment on life satisfaction is then determined by
The total effect of past unemployment is empirically determined by estimating function (1), which corresponds to implicitly imposing Ž 4 = Ž 5 = 0 in specification (2). Clark et al. (2001) find that current unemployment leads to lower life satisfaction (Ž 1 < 0), past unemployment reduces current well-being for those who are currently in employment (Ž 2 < 0), and that past unemployment has a smaller negative effect on currently unemployed than on currently employed persons (Ž 2 < Ž 3 ). This last finding can also be interpreted as a •habituation‚ effect because it implies that becoming unemployed hurts less if one has already experienced more unemployment in the past.
In our estimations, we do not impose any restrictions on Ž 4 and Ž • in specification (2) and are thus able to distinguish between the effects of past unemployment and future unemployment risk on current well-being. This allows us to test whether past unemployment has a direct impact on current well-being or whether the negative effect is indirectly caused by the fear of future unemployment. Thus, our two hypotheses are:
Genuine Scarring: Past unemployment scars directly. It reduces current well-being both for currently unemployed persons (Ž 3 < 0) and also for persons who have become reemployed in the meantime (Ž 2 < 0), holding a personƒs future employment prospects constant.
Scaring:
The prospect of being unemployed in the future is frightening and reduces current well-being both for those currently employed (Ž 4 < 0) and unemployed (Ž 5 < 0).
Life satisfaction is measured as an ordinal categorical variable. To take the ordinal nature of the life satisfaction variable into account, we first estimate our model using the ordered probit model. In a second step, we apply the fixed-effect ordered logit estimator developed by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) to control for time-invariant personal traits. 5 We choose the fixed effect model because recent findings indicate that time-invariant individual traits exert a strong influence on life satisfaction. For example, Lykken and Tellegen (1996) find evidence that up to 80 percent of the interpersonal variation in well-being is influenced by individual genes and personal traits. More recently, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) show that taking account of individual-specific effects is essential in explaining happiness (even more than distinguishing between cardinality and interpersonal ordinality of the satisfaction answers). 5 We follow Clark et al. (2001) in conducting a pooled ordered probit regression before the fixed-effects logit estimation. Clark et al. (2001) , however, use the fixed effect logit estimator developed by Chamberlain (1980) , which transforms the categorical LS-scale into a binary variable by imposing one and the same cut-off level on all individuals. This method has the disadvantage of losing all observations of individuals who always report LS- 
Estimation Results
The results of our ordered probit estimation are presented in Table 2 . 6 The results shown in Columns 1 and 2 refer to a specification without any intertemporal effects (setting Ž 2 = Ž 3 = 0 in equation (1)). This is the standard approach taken by most studies on the well-being effect of unemployment that restrict their attention to how variables at time t influence well-being at time t. 7 Our results are in line with these studies, which provide overwhelming evidence that becoming unemployed reduces individual life satisfaction by much more than what can be explained by the associated income loss. Even if one could entirely compensate a person for the loss in income caused by unemployment, so that the person could, in principle, enjoy more leisure without reducing consumption, the person would nevertheless suffer from lower life satisfaction.
•Work‚ not only serves the purpose of earning a living, but also has additional, non-pecuniary benefits. Part-time work and self-employment reduce the life satisfaction of men, but not that of women. The income coefficient is positive and highly significant: more income increases life satisfaction of men and women.
Columns 3 and 4 present the results obtained by estimating the benchmark specification
(1). We integrate separate measures of past unemployment of the employed and the unemployed as well as a measure of past income (average income over the previous three years).
Our results reproduce the main findings of Clark et al. (2001) , even with our larger dataset.
Currently unemployed individuals are worse off than those in full-time employment. Past unemployment significantly reduces the life satisfaction of all groups (except for unemployed women). The effect is larger for the employed than for the unemployed, so that switching from employment to unemployment hurts less if a person has already been unemployed more often in the past. This can be seen by calculating the difference between the life satisfaction of employed and unemployed persons with the same amount of past unemployment. The life satisfaction of an employed man who had been unemployed for x percent of the previous three years is lower by -0.71*x than the life satisfaction of an employed men without any past unemployment experience. 8 An unemployed man has a lower life satisfaction than an employed man given by the coefficient -0.75, but past unemployment of x percent affects his satisfaction 6 We abstain from presenting summary statistics of the happiness scores and do not explicitly report the coefficients of our control variables because the results are in line with previous studies (see Frey and Stutzer (2002) , Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) , or Frijters et al. (2004) ). 7 There are numerous studies showing that contemporaneous unemployment has a strong, negative effect on subjective well-being, see, for example, Clark and Oswald (1994) , Gerlach and Stephan (1996) , Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) , Korpi (1997) , Stutzer (2000, 2002) , Clark (2003 Clark ( , 2006 , Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) . 8 It should be kept in mind that the magnitude of the coefficients of an ordered probit estimation are not to be interpreted as marginal effects directly, but that they represent shifts in the cut-offs of a normal distribution.
only by -0.34 * x. The difference between the life satisfaction of an employed man and an unemployed man with past unemployment experience of x percent is then given by -0.71x -(-0.75 -0.34x) = 0.75 -0.37x. This shows that the loss in life satisfaction from unemployment is smaller if the fraction of time spent unemployed in the past is larger. Hence, the benchmark model produces supportive evidence both for the scarring effect and for habituation to unemployment.
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We now want to test whether this negative impact of past unemployment persists once we control for the fear of future unemployment. The main results of estimating specification (2) are shown in Columns 5 and 6 of With respect to unemployment experienced in the past, Table 2 shows that the ordered probit estimation also finds evidence for a scarring effect, although the coefficients are smaller (in absolute values) than in the specification without future effects. Even if one holds a personƒs assessment of her future employment prospects constant, having experienced more unemployment in the past still turns out to be detrimental to subjective well-being. The impact of past unemployment, however, is overestimated in the benchmark model because people interpret longer unemployment spells in the past as an indicator of a higher risk of becoming unemployed in the future (past unemployment and the subjective assessment of bad future prospects are positively correlated). Since people are afraid of future unemployment, omitting future prospects from the estimation causes an overestimation of the coefficients on past unemployment in specification (1). To sum up, the ordered probit model shows that both the experience of past unemployment and the fear of becoming (or remaining) unemployed in the future have a negative impact on current well-being.
A drawback of the ordered probit model is that it does not allow us to control for timeinvariant personality traits. This raises doubts about the causality of the relationship between unemployment and unhappiness. If it were the case that inherently unhappy people tend to become unemployed more often, or have a tendency to be more pessimistic about their future, one would observe that (past) unemployment and bad future prospects are correlated with less happiness, but their relation would be simultaneous instead of causal. To correct for such causality problems, it has become common practice in the happiness literature to apply a fixed effects model that effectively uses only data about changes in the life circumstances of the same individual instead of comparing different persons with each other. By using fixed effects, one can thus control for personal predispositions in life satisfaction.
10 Table 3 contains the results from a fixed-effect conditional logit estimation (Ferrer-iCarbonell and Frijters (2004) ). In columns (1) and (2), we present the estimation without past unemployment effects. The results are similar to the ordered probit estimation in Table 2 . Being unemployed reduces well-being both for men and for women. Compared to full-time employment, both men and women suffer from being employed part-time or self-employed. Income raises the life satisfaction of both sexes. In columns (3) and (4), we add past unemployment and past income as explanatory variables. Even with fixed effects, past unemployment maintains its negative impact on the life satisfaction of currently employed and unemployed men. For unemployed women, however, it is insignificant, and it even becomes positive for employed women.
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10 Even though the fixed effects model controls for time-invariant personality traits, we cannot rule out an alternative explanation to the scaring hypothesis. It might be that past unemployment reduces a personƒs current life satisfaction and his general level of optimism at the same time because both could be two different manifestations of the same underlying emotional state. In this case, the correlation between less optimistic outlooks on the future and currently lower happiness would not be causal but only simultaneous. Our data do not allow us to test directly how the causality runs. The available evidence, however, points to a causal relationship going from past unemployment to an increased fear of becoming unemployed in the future to lower well-being. Arulampalam et al. (2001) were able to show that an individualƒs past history of unemployment is the best predictor of his future risk of unemployment. The psychological literature has also established that job insecurity causes lower wellbeing (see de Witte 1999 for a survey). Taken together, it seems plausible that the relationship is causal rather than just simultaneous. 11 A possible explanation for this positive effect (that becomes apparent only after controlling for the sorting effect by considering individual fixed effects, c.f. Table 2 ) could be that finding a job after having been unemployed for some time is a surprising, favorable occasion and thus gives a larger boost to life satisfaction. Another explanation is that finding a new job after being unemployed causes an •overshooting‚ in life satisfaction with subsequent downward adaptation to its long-run level. Since the UEPAST3 measure (time spent in unemployment during the last three years) declines during each year the person stays in his new job, downward adaptation in happiness and lower measures of past unemployment are correlated, yielding a positive relationship between past unemployment and happiness of employed persons. An explicit analysis of this adaptation process is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Adding expectations about the future changes these results significantly (columns (5) and (6)). As in the ordered probit estimation, taking future unemployment risk into account captures a large proportion of the negative well-being effect previously assigned to past unemployment. The coefficients on past unemployment weaken so much that we do not find evidence for a scarring effect for employed and unemployed men anymore. Unfavorable expectations about the future, however, maintain their strong impact on life satisfaction even when we control for fixed effects. This holds for the employed as well as for the unemployed. Employed persons with more job security are significantly happier than if they were employed in riskier jobs, and the unemployed are much happier if they expect finding a new job to be easy compared to situations where they see more difficulties in becoming reemployed. Even if we control for time-invariant personality traits, we find overwhelming evidence for a scaring effect of future unemployment.
It is also an illuminating exercise to compare the relative size of the estimates. To sum up, our results suggest that the evidence for a genuine scarring effect, which postulates that past unemployment has a direct effect on current well-being, is substantially weakened by taking into account a personƒs future employment prospects and by allowing for fixed personality traits. We find overwhelming evidence, however, that employed persons suffer from a much lower level of life satisfaction if they feel that their job is insecure and that they might become unemployed in the near future. Likewise, persons without a job feel much happier if it is easy for them to find a new job so that they expect to become reemployed rather quickly. It is not so much that a person has experienced unemployment in the past that causes a loss in life satisfaction, but that unemployment might occur (again) in the future.
Conclusion
Our starting point is the •scarring‚ hypothesis of Clark et al. (2001) , according to which people who were unemployed in the past are less happy than continuously employed persons even after they return to employment. In their terminology, unemployment leaves a scar on a personƒs face. Our results suggest that the scarring effect of Clark et al. (2001) works mainly through its impact on how people judge their own future. People interpret their own past unemployment as an indicator of their future labor market prospects. If they have experienced more unemployment in the past, they are more afraid that this might happen to them again.
This insecurity about the future is detrimental to life satisfaction. Our findings suggest that it is the fear of future unemployment rather than having experienced unemployment in the past that makes people feel less happy.
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years 1984 to 2005, we modify the analysis of Clark et al. (2001) by distinguishing between the impact of past unemployment and insecurity about future employment prospects on current life satisfaction. Our results
show that, once we control for future insecurity and time-invariant personality traits, the amount of time a person was unemployed in the past loses much of its explanatory power for current well-being. We find only weak evidence that past unemployment has a direct negative effect on the well-being of both currently employed and currently unemployed persons. We do find, however, that the prospect of being unemployed in the future is highly detrimental to current life satisfaction. Low job security for the employed and unfavorable reemployment chances of the unemployed are harmful to subjective well-being even after controlling for individual-specific fixed effects.
Our results show that the scarring effect of past unemployment can be explained best through its effect on peopleƒs fear of future unemployment. It is this fear, rather than any direct effects of past unemployment, that makes people unhappy. The label for the intertemporal effects of unemployment should thus be changed by one letter: past unemployment •scars‚ because it •scares‚.
